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REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Joint Petitioners' Confidential Exhibit No. 1 Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC RoseWater Wind Generation LLC Page 1

VERIFIED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ANDREW S. CAMPBELL

1	Q1.	Please state your name, business address and title.
2	A1.	My name is Andrew S. Campbell. I am the Director of Regulatory Support
3		& Planning for Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC
4		("NIPSCO"). My business address is 1500 165th Street, Hammond,
5		Indiana 46320.
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6	Q2.	On whose behalf are you submitting this direct testimony?
7	A2.	I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Joint Petitioners NIPSCO and
8		RoseWater Wind Generation LLC ("Joint Venture").
9	Q3.	Please describe your educational and employment background.
10	A3.	I graduated from Purdue University Calumet with a Bachelor of Science in
11		Mechanical Engineering and graduate studies in Interdisciplinary
12		Engineering. Additionally, I graduated with a Master of Business
13		Administration from the University of Notre Dame. I began my
14		employment with NIPSCO in June of 2009 as an Operations Analysis

Engineer. In September of 2011, I was promoted to the Manager of

Page 2

Operations & Market Support and in May of 2013, assumed the role of Manager of Planning & Regulatory Support. In September of 2017, I was promoted to my current role as Director of Regulatory Support & Prior to joining NIPSCO, I worked as an engineer for an industrial manufacturing company that specialized in engine attachments for marine and small power generation applications. I am also a veteran of the Army National Guard.

8 Q4. What are your responsibilities as Director of Regulatory Support &

Planning?

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A4. As the Director of Regulatory Support & Planning, I am responsible for leading the regulatory support and financial planning functions for the Energy Supply & Optimization ("ES&O") department within NIPSCO, whereby my team supports NIPSCO's operations within the electric and natural gas markets. More specifically, my team is responsible for leading all electric and natural gas rate case related support activities for the ES&O department, supporting the forecast and reconciliation of NIPSCO's Fuel Adjustment Clause ("FAC"), Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO") Adjustment, Resource Adequacy ("RA") Adjustment, Green

Power Rider ("GPR"), Gas Cost Adjustment ("GCA"), leading the development of NIPSCO's natural gas and electric hedging programs, and supporting NIPSCO's financial and business planning cadence. Most recently, I have been leading the commercial execution of NIPSCO's generation strategy outlined within its 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP").

7 Q5. Have you previously testified before this or any other regulatory

commission?

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Yes. Most recently, I submitted testimony in NIPSCO's electric rate case currently pending in Cause No. 45159. I previously submitted testimony in NIPSCO's gas rate case in Cause No. 44988, NIPSCO's request for approval of its 2018 Hedging Plan (Cause No. 38706-FAC-118), NIPSCO's request for approval of an amendment to NIPSCO's 2017-2018 financing authority (Cause No. 45020), and in the following tracker filings: GCA tracker filings (Cause No. 43629-GCA-XX), FAC tracker filings (Cause No. 38706-FAC-XX), RA Adjustment tracker filings (Cause No. 44155-RA-XX), and RTO Adjustment tracker filings (Cause No. 44156-RTO-XX).

1 Q6. What is the purpose of your direct testimony in this proceeding?

2 A6. The purpose of my direct testimony is to support Joint Petitioners' request 3 for an order authorizing NIPSCO to begin implementation of its 4 generation transition plan as set forth in its Integrated Resource Plan 5 submitted October 31, 2018 ("2018 IRP"), as follows: (1) issue NIPSCO a 6 certificate of public convenience and necessity ("CPCN") to purchase and 7 acquire indirectly through Joint Venture a wind farm that will have an 8 aggregate nameplate capacity of approximately 102 megawatt ("MW") 9 ("Rosewater Project"); (2) approve the Rosewater Project as a clean energy 10 project under Ind. Code § 8-1-8.8-11; (3) approve associated ratemaking 11 and accounting treatment for the Rosewater Project; (4) establish 12 amortization rates for NIPSCO's investment in the Rosewater Project 13 through Joint Venture; (5) approve pursuant to Ind. Code § 8-1-2.5-6 an 14 alternative regulatory plan ("ARP") to implement the Rosewater project as 15 set forth herein, including establishment of Joint Venture and the reflection 16 in NIPSCO's net original cost rate base of its investment in Joint Venture; 17 (6) approve purchased power agreements through which NIPSCO will 18 acquire the energy generated by the Rosewater Project, including timely 19 cost recovery through NIPSCO's FAC; (7) authorize deferral of

amortization and accrual of post-in service carrying charges ("PISCC") on NIPSCO's capital investment in Joint Venture; (8) to the extent generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") would treat any aspect of Joint Venture as debt on NIPSCO's financial statements, grant necessary financing approval; (9) approve an ARP for NIPSCO in order to facilitate the implementation of the Rosewater Project; and (10) to the extent necessary, pursuant to Ind. Code § 8-1-2.5-5, decline to exercise jurisdiction over Joint Venture as a public utility.¹

I provide a broad overview of the proposed transactions and provide references to the other witnesses who provide more in-depth discussions of the topics. I also discuss how NIPSCO will integrate the wind into NIPSCO's and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.'s ("MISO") operations. I also discuss the viability of wind energy resources generally, and the terms of the Build Transfer Agreement ("BTA") and the

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At the same time NIPSCO and Joint Venture filed its Verified Joint Petition in this Cause, EDPR filed its Verified Petition requesting that the Commission, pursuant to Ind. Code § 8-1-2.5-5, decline to exercise any jurisdiction to (a) require Petitioner to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct the Project under Ind. Code Ch. 8-1-8.5, the "Powerplant Construction Act" and (b) regulate, under Ind. Code Ch. 8-1-2, the "Public Service Commission Act," Petitioner's construction, ownership and operation of, and other activities in connection with, the Project.

BTA power purchase agreement ("PPA") outlining NIPSCO's rights to the wind energy project's production, capacity, and environmental attributes, and the benefits associated with the environmental attributes in the form of Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs"). I then describe the Back-Stop PPA which will only come into play if the conditions precedent to the BTA are not met. I set forth and support NIPSCO's ARP and its request for issuance of a CPCN. Finally, I discuss NIPSCO's proposal for recovering the costs associated with the Joint Venture and the BTA PPA, which will be in effect if all the conditions precedent to the BTA are met, and the Back-Stop PPA, which will be in effect if all the conditions precedent to the BTA are not met.

12 Q7. Are you sponsoring any attachments to your direct testimony?

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13 A7. Yes. I am sponsoring the following attachments, all of which were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision.

Attachment 1-A	Verified Joint Petition
Confidential Attachment 1-B	Build Transfer Agreement by and
	between RoseWater Wind
	Generation LLC, as Purchaser and
	EDP Renewables North America
	LLC, as Seller ("BTA")
Confidential Attachment 1-C	Wind Energy Purchase Agreement

	between Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC and
	Rosewater Wind Farm LLC, as
	Seller (the "BTA PPA")
Confidential Attachment 1-D	Back-Stop Wind Energy Purchase
	Agreement between Northern
	Indiana Public Service Company
	LLC and Rosewater Wind Farm
	LLC, as Seller ("Back-Stop PPA")
Confidential Attachment 1-E	Example Term Sheet

GENERATION TRANSITION PLAN

1 Q8. Please explain NIPSCO's generation transition plan.

2 A8. The 2018 IRP included a short-term action plan consisting of the actions 3 NIPSCO will take for the period 2019-2021. The short-term plan focuses 4 on initiating the retirement process for all of the coal-fired units at R.M. 5 Schahfer Generation Station and selecting/acquiring replacement projects 6 to fill the capacity gap. In connection with the 2018 IRP, NIPSCO 7 conducted an all-source request for proposals ("All-Source RFP"), which 8 generated a robust response. The responses indicated there are more than 9 enough diverse resources and projects to meet NIPSCO's supply needs in 10 2023. 90 proposals supported by 59 projects across 5 states were received. 11 Each proposal was evaluated and scored independently from NIPSCO. 12 The projects scoring the highest were short-listed and proceeded to

negotiation of definitive agreements. The Rosewater Project was one of those short-listed proposals. The other two responses, which are the subject of petitions being filed in other dockets, are purchased power agreements between NIPSCO and Jordan Creek Wind Farm LLC and between NIPSCO and Roaming Bison Wind, LLC. The three filings together request authority to obtain a total of 800 MWs of wind capacity. All three wind projects are projected to have a 2020 in service date and are all located in western Indiana north of Indianapolis.

INTRODUCTION AND VIABILITY OF WIND ENERGY RESOURCES

9 Q9. Is wind energy a viable energy resource?

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10 A9. Yes. Wind is a renewable, local, and clean energy source. Wind energy 11 projects do not use fossil or nuclear fuel in operation, which means no 12 mining or drilling for fuel, no radioactive or hazardous wastes, no use of 13 water for steam or cooling, and no emissions of greenhouse gases or other 14 pollutants. The absence of fossil or nuclear fuel also means the price of 15 wind power is not impacted by the volatility of commodities. Due to 16 meteorological and resource diversity of the MISO footprint, the location 17 of these wind projects influences the capacity accreditation and available

wind energy for NIPSCO's customers. As mentioned by NIPSCO Witness

Lee, all three projects being proposed by NIPSCO in this first tranche are
located in Indiana, more specifically the part of Indiana with advantageous
meteorological and resource diversity conditions in the MISO footprint.

For these reasons, and with advances in wind technology in areas such as
wind turbine availability, capacity factor, design and size, and wind
mapping,² wind energy has become a viable source of renewable energy
resources on a per megawatt-hour ("MWh") basis.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED TRANSACTIONS

9 Q10. Please describe the Rosewater Project.

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A10. The Rosewater Project is being implemented through a series of agreements – the BTA, a BTA PPA, a Back-Stop PPA (in the event the parties do not close), as well as two more agreements to be executed in late 2019 or early 2020. EDP Renewables North America LLC ("EDPR" or "Developer"), through a special purpose entity known as Rosewater Wind Farm LLC ("Rosewater ProjectCo"), is developing an approximately 25

Manning refers to the process of assessing im

² Mapping refers to the process of assessing impacts of existing wind resources, restrictions on land use, and other sensitivities that may affect wind energy.

Page 10

1 turbine wind farm and associated electric transmission line in White 2 County, Indiana (utilizing MISO interconnect request J513), which wind 3 farm will have an aggregate nameplate capacity of approximately 102 MW 4 and is commonly referred to as the Rosewater Project (Figure 1 below). 5 The Rosewater Project is expected to achieve commercial operation in the 6 fourth quarter of 2020. The size of the project may change slightly as 7 engineering and technical specifications are finalized. 8 Pursuant to the BTA, and as explained in the Example Term Sheet 9 (Confidential Attachment 1-E), Joint Venture will purchase 100% of the 10 equity interest in Rosewater ProjectCo from Developer (Figure 2 below). 11 As a pre-condition to the transaction, a Joint Venture Operating 12 Agreement (the "LLC Agreement") must be executed under which Joint 13 Venture will be owned initially by three members. The first member is a 14 Tax Equity Partner ("TEP") that is a financial investor, which will not be 15 responsible for project operations. The TEP has not yet been identified. 16 The second member is Developer, which is the entity that is constructing 17 the Rosewater Project through Rosewater ProjectCo. Third is NIPSCO, 18 which will manage the RoseWater Project at the closing of the transaction

under the BTA. NIPSCO is the managing member and will initially own approximately 1% of Joint Venture. Developer will build the Rosewater Project through Rosewater ProjectCo, and Rosewater ProjectCo will own Developer will transfer 100% of Rosewater the Rosewater Project. ProjectCo to Joint Venture pursuant to the BTA when the Rosewater Project begins operating in late 2020 (Figure 2 below). Immediately prior to the transfer, Developer will invest a portion of the proceeds to be paid by Joint Venture pursuant to the BTA into the Joint Venture in return for an ownership share of the Joint Venture, which it will hold until 2023. For its share, TEP will invest a percentage of the amount needed to pay Joint Venture's obligation under the BTA. NIPSCO will invest the remaining amount needed under the BTA in return for its share of Joint Venture. In 2023, NIPSCO will purchase Developer's interest in Joint Venture for cash (Figure 3 below). TEP's interest in Joint Venture will enable it to receive of the Production Tax Credits ("PTCs") and tax losses generated by the Rosewater Project along with distributions of up to of any excess cash generated by the Rosewater Project. Once TEP has attained an internal rate of return as specified in the LLC Agreement, the allocation of taxable income, loss, gain and deductions drops to . At this point,

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
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Joint Petitioner's Confidential Exhibit No. 1 Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC RoseWater Wind Generation LLC Page 12

1		NIPSCO will have the option to acquire the TEP interest for fair market
2		value as defined in the LLC Agreement (Figure 4 below). Lastly, NIPSCO
3		can consolidate the wind project and eliminate the need for the BTA PPA
4		(Figure 5 below).
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5	QII.	Please provide an illustration of the transaction structure summarized
6		above.
7	A11.	Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the transactions surrounding the Joint
8		Venture through time:
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Figure 1 – January 2019

RoseWater Wind Generation LLC (Joint Venture) enters into agreements with EDPR (Developer) to build Rosewater Project (Wind Farm)



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
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Joint Venture enters into the BTA with the Developer to build the Rosewater Project. NIPSCO also enters into the BTA PPA with Rosewater Wind Farm LLC (ProjectCo) to be the sole off-taker of energy from the project.

Figure 2 – December 2020



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
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5 6 7 Upon completion of construction, EDPR, Tax Equity Partner and NIPSCO contribute cash to the Joint Venture. The Joint Venture uses the cash to acquire the ProjectCo from EDPR. The ProjectCo commences operations and sells output from the project to NIPSCO under the terms of the BTA PPA.

1 <u>Figure 3 – Mid-2023</u>




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In mid-2023, NIPSCO purchases the EDPR membership interest in the Joint Venture. NIPSCO continues to pay the ProjectCo for the output of the project under the terms of the BTA PPA. This arrangement continues until the Tax Equity Partner reaches the specified IRR or the BTA PPA is terminated in 2035.

Figure 4 – Approximately 2030




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At the time the Tax Equity Partner achieves the targeted internal rate of return, NIPSCO has the option to purchase the membership interest of the Tax Equity Partner in the Joint Venture at fair market value. If NIPSCO exercises the option to acquire the membership interest of the Tax Equity Partner, NIPSCO will own 100% of the project.

Figure 5 - Post-Option Exercise



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If NIPSCO exercises the option to acquire the Tax Equity Partner's membership interest in the Joint Venture, NIPSCO will liquidate both the Joint Venture and the ProjectCo and will own the wind farm directly.

There also will no longer be a need for the BTA PPA.

Q12. Is it possible that NIPSCO would need to make investments in the Joint

Venture beyond those that you have described?

9 A12. Yes. NIPSCO does not anticipate a need for additional investment beyond
10 what is contemplated in the agreements. However, situations such as, but
11 not limited to, force majeure or extended forced outages where the
12 Rosewater Project is unable to produce for an extended period of time,
13 could result in a need for additional investment. NIPSCO seeks authority
14 in this case to include any such additional payments as an increase of its
15 investment in the Joint Venture.

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1	Q13.	Tou mentioned two PPAs – a BTA PPA and a Back-Stop PPA. WIII
2		NIPSCO enter a traditional PPA with Rosewater ProjectCo, the owner of
3		the Rosewater Project?
4	A13.	Yes, but which of two PPAs depends on whether the conditions precedent
5		to the BTA are satisfied. In this filing, NIPSCO is requesting the necessary
6		approvals to purchase the electrical energy output from the Rosewater
7		Project either through a Wind Energy Purchase Agreement between
8		NIPSCO and Rosewater ProjectCo (after transfer of Rosewater ProjectCo's
9		equity to the Joint Venture) – the BTA PPA, or a Back-Stop Wind Energy
10		Purchase Agreement between NIPSCO and Rosewater ProjectCo (without
11		transfer of ownership to the Joint Venture) – the Back-Stop PPA. Both
12		PPAs will have a term of 15 years. The price under the BTA PPA is \$
13		per MWh. The price under the Back-Stop PPA is \$ per MWh. The
14		conditions precedent that are necessary for NIPSCO to proceed with the
15		Joint Venture structure are discussed in greater detail by Witness McCuen.
16		As further described below, if all the conditions precedent are met, EDPR
17		will sell its equity in Rosewater ProjectCo to the Joint Venture. Witness
18		Camp describes the cost recovery authority sought with respect to both
19		PPAs.

1	Q14.	How	was	the	pricing	for	the	BTA	PPA	and	the	Back-Stop	PPA
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2 determined?

- 3 During the definitive agreement phase of commercial negotiations 4 between NIPSCO and EDPR, the prices for both the BTA PPA and the 5 Back-Stop PPA were offered as a revised proposal from EDPR which 6 contemplates the Joint Venture structure. The prices for both PPAs are in 7 line with other proposals received through the All-Source RFP and are 8 considered to be market-based prices at a level in which the transaction 9 will attract a Tax Equity Partner's investment. The market price was 10 discovered through an open and competitive RFP. Attracting the TEP is a 11 key component of the transaction whether the BTA and BTA PPA is in full 12 effect or if the Back-Stop PPA is employed. As explained by Witness 13 Augustine, it is also consistent with the modeling in the 2018 IRP.
- 14 Q15. Please describe the members of the Joint Venture.
- 15 A15. The members of the Joint Venture are (1) NIPSCO, which formed the Joint
 16 Venture on December 11, 2018, (2) EDPR, which is developing Rosewater
 17 through Rosewater ProjectCo, which will own the Rosewater Project, and
 18 (3) a TEP, which will be a financial investor that will not have any

- 1 operational rights in the Joint Venture.
- 2 Q16. Please describe the Joint Venture as it exists today.
- 3 A16. NIPSCO formed RoseWater Wind Generation LLC under the laws of 4 Delaware to serve as the Joint Venture. Prior to the closing of the Equity 5 Capital Contribution Agreement ("ECCA") and the Joint Venture 6 Operating Agreement ("LLC Agreement"), the Joint Venture will be a 7 shell. Both of these two agreements must be executed as a condition to 8 closing in the BTA. It is anticipated that the ECCA will be entered into in 9 January 2020 when a form of the LLC Agreement will be agreed to between 10 the parties to the ECCA. The LLC Agreement will be executed in 11 connection with the closing of the sale of the Rosewater ProjectCo to the 12 Joint Venture. The ECCA will obligate NIPSCO, EDPR and the TEP to 13 contribute funds to the Joint Venture to fund the purchase of Rosewater 14 The LLC Agreement will govern the operation and ProjectCo. 15 management of the Joint Venture after the purchase of Rosewater 16 ProjectCo. As noted above, NIPSCO will be the managing member of the 17 Joint Venture. The LLC Agreement will also require NIPSCO to purchase 18 EDPR's interest in the Joint Venture in 2023. NIPSCO will then purchase

- the TEP's interest in the Joint Venture in 2030. Witness McCuen provides a full description and discussion of the ECCA and LLC Agreement.
- 3 Q17. Please briefly describe EDPR.
- A17. EDPR develops, constructs, owns, and operates wind and solar renewable
 energy projects throughout the United States. EDPR is based in Houston,
 Texas, with over 600 employees and regional offices in New York, Oregon,
 Illinois, Indiana, and Massachusetts. EDPR's parent, EDP Renováveis SA,
 is the fourth largest developer of renewable energy projects in the world,
 and EDPR is notably, the largest generator of wind energy in Indiana.³
 - Q18. What experience does EDPR have in the wind generation business?
- A18. As an industry leader, EDPR develops projects internally through
 experienced in-house teams of project developers, project managers,
 energy assessment engineers, design engineers, construction engineers,
 and supportive staff. As such, EDPR has permitted and constructed over
 600 MW in White County, Indiana, and another 200 MW in Randolph
 County, Indiana, and is extremely familiar with permitting requirements

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³ Information obtained from EDPR's response to the All-Source RFP.

1 associated with wind farm development	1	associated	with	wind	farm	devel	opment
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2 (O19.	Please discuss	EDPR's	creditworthiness.
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3 A19. EDPR's financial ability to complete construction of the wind project and 4 transfer it to the Joint Venture is key to NIPSCO and the Joint Venture. 5 NIPSCO has taken this into consideration by including adequate assurance 6 provisions in the BTA. Furthermore, as part of NIPSCO's due diligence 7 when evaluating the creditworthiness of potential counterparties, NIPSCO 8 gathered and reviewed credit information during the pre-qualification 9 process in the All-Source RFP. Counterparties that were investment grade 10 based on their unsecured senior debt rating met the credit requirements. 11 If a bidder did not meet the debt rating requirement or did not have a 12 rating, they were required to post collateral upon executing a definitive 13 agreement. EDPR met this requirement.

Q20. Has an agreement with the TEP been executed?

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15 A20. No. As further described by Witness McCuen, the agreements that are
16 necessary to be executed by the TEP(s) will be negotiated prior to execution
17 of the ECCA in January 2020.

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1	Q21.	What is the general role of the TEP(s) in the Joint Venture?
2	A21.	The TEP(s) will contribute cash to the Joint Venture equal to approximately
3		% of the purchase price of Rosewater ProjectCo under the terms of
4		the BTA.
5	Q22.	Why would the TEP(s) become a party to the Joint Venture?
6	A22.	The TEP(s) will be a party to the Joint Venture because it will be able to
7		fully use the PTCs that the project will receive. The terms of the Joint
8		Venture are more fully discussed by Witness McCuen.
9	Q23.	Please briefly summarize the terms of the BTA.
10	A23.	The BTA requires EDPR to develop the Rosewater Project through
11		Rosewater ProjectCo and then sell 100% of the equity interest in Rosewater
12		ProjectCo to the Joint Venture in 2020, when it is anticipated that all of the
13		conditions precedent will be met.
14	Q24.	What is the total cost to Joint Venture for the purchase of the equity
15		interest in Rosewater ProjectCo?
16	A24.	The total price is \$, prior to adjustments as set forth in the
17		BTA.

1	Q25.	Does EDPR provide any financial assurance that it will meet its
2		obligations under the BTA?
3	A25.	Yes. The BTA requires EDPR to provide by September 2019 either a
4		guaranty or a letter of credit from a qualified guarantor or from a qualified
5		financial institution. After the Closing Date, the amount of the guaranty
6		or letter of credit remains in effect until the earlier of the date when all of
7		EDPR's obligations have been satisfied or the third anniversary of the
8		closing of the BTA. In the event that EDPR is in default of any of its
9		obligations under the BTA or the Joint Venture, and by extension NIPSCO,
10		is otherwise entitled to indemnification or damages under the BTA, then
11		the Joint Venture has a right to access the credit support directly to
12		reimburse the Joint Venture, and by extension NIPSCO, for any damages
13		or costs incurred as a result of EDPR's failure to comply with its obligations
14		under the BTA.
15	O26.	Please describe the terms of the BTA PPA?
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16	A26.	The BTA PPA provides NIPSCO with 100% of the electrical energy output
17		of the Rosewater Project, the unforced capacity (UCAP), which represents

the percentage of installed capacity (ICAP) available after a units forced

1		outage rate is taken into account as shown in the BTA PPA, and any
2		environmental attributes of the project for 15 years.
3	Q27.	Please describe the process by which NIPSCO selected the Joint Venture
4		structure as the preferred option.
5	A27.	In the first quarter of 2018, NIPSCO retained CRA International d/b/a
6		Charles River Associates, Inc. ("CRA") to assist in the design,
7		administration, and bid evaluation of a Request for Proposals ("RFP"). The
8		purpose of the RFP was to solicit binding bids to cover an anticipated
9		capacity shortfall starting in 2023 and to obtain market-based information
10		on the cost and performance of alternative resource options to inform and
11		improve NIPSCO's 2018 IRP.
12		Through the process, NIPSCO received bids supported by renewable
13		facilities, fossil resources, energy storage, and demand response options.
14		Bids for both standalone assets and integrated facilities comprised of
15		different resource types or supported by storage were submitted.
16		Bidders offered assets under PPAs and offered assets for sale. Witness
17		Augustine explains NIPSCO's IRP process, and Witness Lee explains
18		NIPSCO's RFP process, including the timeline, design, execution, review,

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1		evaluation, and conclusions.
2	Q28.	What role did you have in the All-Source RFP process?
3	A28.	My role was to ensure that the process conformed to NIPSCO's intent to
4		competitively bid and secure additional electric energy and capacity in the
5		amount needed to serve NIPSCO's retail customers in the future, and that
6		CRA conducted the process in a fair and transparent manner.
7	Q29.	Once the preferred plan within the IRP was chosen and the RFP results
8		were reviewed, how did NIPSCO proceed?
9	A29.	NIPSCO, in conjunction with CRA, negotiated with developers of the most
10		viable wind energy projects. During the negotiations, the number of wind
11		projects was reduced to four projects. After completion of negotiations
12		over the terms, conditions and price, NIPSCO executed three wind
13		agreements for a total purchase of approximately 800 MW of wind power.
14		The size of each project may change slightly as engineering and technical
15		specifications are finalized.
16	Q30.	Please explain how NIPSCO reached its decision to contract for the 102
17		MW of electric energy made available through the Rosewater Project.
18	A30.	Witness Augustine explains NIPSCO's 2018 IRP process and the

demonstrated need for additional electric supply to maintain adequate
electric reserves beginning in 2023. The decision to contract for the wind
in 2020 was based upon NIPSCO's and CRA's analysis that NIPSCO's
customers, over the life of the projects, would save approximately \$500
Million due to the declining value of the production tax credits, as
described by Witness McCuen. The Rosewater Project plays a role in
satisfying NIPSCO's electric planning goals and objectives.

8 Q31. How are congestion risks of the Rosewater Project assessed?

- 9 A31. Congestion risks were assessed using MISO's future year ProMod models
 10 which are capable of simulating hourly market operations for a given
 11 study year. The output was then used to determine the expected
 12 curtailments, total revenue and congestion and loss charges for each site
 13 under consideration. Sites with greater congestion risk have been
 14 appropriately discounted in NIPSCO site analysis.
- Q32. Where is the Rosewater Project in the MISO queue and are there any interconnection issues or other delay issues?
- 17 A32. The wind project's general interconnection agreement has been completed 18 and is in the MISO queue (J513). The point of interconnection is NIPSCO's

1	138kV Reynolds Substation. To facilitate the project's interconnection,
2	upgrades are required at the Reynolds Substation and work is to be
3	completed in August of 2020 by NIPSCO as the interconnecting utility.

4 Q33. How will NIPSCO account for the wind energy provided by the BTA

PPA?

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NIPSCO will take delivery of the wind energy from Rosewater ProjectCo at a specified metering point. NIPSCO will be the Market Participant and will make the energy available in the MISO energy market. NIPSCO will be paying the Joint Venture (through the Rosewater ProjectCo) the contract price per MWh and counting this wind energy as used in the NIPSCO system. NIPSCO will "settle" the sale price for the wind energy sold into MISO against the price paid for the wind energy. NIPSCO offers its generation and bids its load into the MISO energy markets daily, along with other sales and purchases, in the end "settling" the costs against revenues. MISO treats wind energy projects as dispatchable intermittent As such, Rosewater ProjectCo will be subject to real-time Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee and Uninstructed Deviation charges assessed under the Open Access Transmission, Energy and Operating

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1		Reserve Markets Tariff ("MISO Tariff").
2	Q34.	Will NIPSCO be able to designate the Rosewater Project as a network
3		resource under the MISO Tariff?
4	A34.	Yes. The generator interconnection agreement that Rosewater ProjectCo
5		will be receiving from MISO will have network resource interconnection
6		service ("NRIS") available for its full injection once any required
7		transmission system upgrades at Reynolds substation are complete.
8		Having NRIS will allow NIPSCO to designate this generation facility as a
9		network resource to receive Network Integration Transmission Service
10		("NITS") without further study.
11	Q35.	If all of the BTA's conditions precedent are met, does the BTA PPA
12		described herein represent prudent, valuable and reasonably priced
13		renewable energy resources for NIPSCO?
14	A35.	Yes. The BTA PPA described herein will provide NIPSCO's customers
15		with a more affordable and cleaner energy resource. This is supported by
16		the analysis performed in NIPSCO's 2018 IRP.

1	Q36.	If all of the conditions precedent contained in the BTA are not met, does
2		the Back-Stop PPA described herein represent prudent, valuable and
3		reasonably priced renewable energy resources for NIPSCO?
4	A36.	Yes. The Back-Stop PPA described herein will provide NIPSCO's
5		customers with a more affordable and cleaner energy resource. This is
6		supported by the analysis performed in NIPSCO's 2018 IRP.
	ALTE	RNATIVE REGULATORY PLAN
7	Q37.	Please describe the alternative practices, procedures and mechanisms
8		NIPSCO is seeking under the alternative regulatory plan.
9	A37.	NIPSCO is requesting approval of the following four alternative practices,
10		procedures and mechanisms in connection with the Joint Venture:
11		(a) Since the Rosewater Project arose out of the All-Source RFP,
12		NIPSCO seeks to be relieved of or otherwise found to have complied with
13		the obligations to receipt of a CPCN established under Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-
14		5(e).
15		(b) NIPSCO will not be the owner of the generating assets that
16		make up the Rosewater Project. Instead, NIPSCO will own an interest in
17		Joint Venture. NIPSCO seeks approval of the Joint Venture and the joint

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venture structure. NIPSCO further seeks to record its interest in the Joint Venture as a regulatory asset in Account 182.3 and to amortize the amounts so recorded using the amortization rates sought to be approved for the Rosewater Project. NIPSCO requests to include in net original cost rate base and in the value of its utility property for purposes of Ind. Code § 8-1-2-6 and for ratemaking purposes the balance of the regulatory asset NIPSCO has recorded for the Joint Venture.

- (c) As noted, NIPSCO seeks to recover its payments made to Rosewater ProjectCo pursuant to the BTA PPA and the Back-Stop PPA, through the FAC without regard to Ind. Code § 8-1-2-42(d)(1) through (4) and without regard to any benchmarks established by the Commission for PPAs.
- (d) To the extent necessary, NIPSCO is seeking approval of financing. To the extent financing approval is sought and obtained herein, NIPSCO seeks to be relieved of the technical requirements set forth in Ind. Code §§ 8-1-2-79 and 80. These include corporate officer signatures and verifications, the elements in Ind. Code § 8-1-2-79(a)(1) through (6), and the specific provisions to be set forth in the Commission's certificate of

1		authority set forth in Ind. Code § 8-1-2-80(a) and (b).
2		In addition, I will describe relief NIPSCO and Joint Venture are seeking
3		regarding the exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction over Joint Venture.
4	Q38.	Is NIPSCO's proposed Joint Venture and participation in the Rosewater
5		Wind Project in the public interest as required for an alternative
6		regulatory plan as set forth in Indiana Code ch 8-1-2.5?
7	A38.	Yes, I believe it is. Indiana Code § 8-1-2.5-6 states in pertinent part:
8 9 10 11 12 13		Sec. 6. (a) Notwithstanding any other law or rule adopted by the commission, except those cited, or rules adopted that pertain to those cited, in section 11 of this chapter, in approving retail energy services or establishing just and reasonable rates and charges, or both for an energy utility electing to become subject to this section, the commission may do the following:
14 15		(1) Adopt alternative regulatory practices, procedures, and mechanisms, and establish rates and charges that:
16 17 18		(A) are in the public interest as determined by consideration of the factors described in section 5 of this chapter; and
19 20		(B) enhance or maintain the value of the energy utility's retail energy services or property;
21 22 23		including practices, procedures, and mechanisms focusing on the price, quality, reliability, and efficiency of service provided by the energy utility.

1		Indiana Code 8-1-2.5-5(b) states in pertinent part:
2		(b) In determining whether the public interest will be served, the commission shall consider the following:
4 5 6 7		(1) Whether technological or operating conditions, competitive forces, or the extent of regulation by other state or federal regulatory bodies render the exercise, in whole or in part, of jurisdiction by the commission unnecessary or wasteful.
8 9 10		(2) Whether the commission's declining to exercise, in whole or in part, its jurisdiction will be beneficial for the energy utility, the energy utility's customers, or the state.
11 12		(3) Whether the commission's declining to exercise, in whole or in part, its jurisdiction will promote energy utility efficiency.
13 14 15		(4) Whether the exercise of commission jurisdiction inhibits an energy utility from competing with other providers of functionally similar energy services or equipment.
16	Q39.	Is the Joint Venture in the public interest and will it enhance the value
17		of NIPSCO's retail energy services or property?
18	A39.	Yes. As described in greater detail by Witness McCuen, the creation of
19		Joint Venture is in the public interest in that it allows NIPSCO to obtain
20		less expensive energy for its customers by maximizing the benefit of the
21		wind project's PTCs. It thus enhances for our customers the value of
22		NIPSCO's retail services. The 2018 IRP shows that the most viable path for
23		NIPSCO customers involves accelerating the retirement of a majority of
24		NIPSCO's remaining coal-fired generation in the next five years and all

coal within the next ten years, with replacement generation provided by
lower-cost renewable energy resources such as wind, solar, and battery
storage. To maximize the benefit for NIPSCO's customers of that lower-
cost renewable energy, NIPSCO must find the path to monetizing the tax
benefits described by Witness McCuen. NIPSCO also must recognize the
value for its customers from NIPSCO being in control of its generation and
minimizing the risk from relying too heavily on counterparties to
purchased power agreements. The Joint Venture structure provides full
control of the renewable energy project by NIPSCO with a much lower
investment and lower risk profile that more efficiently monetizes the tax
benefits of the renewable energy project. If NIPSCO were not to employ
the Joint Venture and outright purchase the project, the value of the tax
benefits associated with the renewable project would be greatly reduced.
The Joint Venture also allows NIPSCO's customers to receive the value of
the tax benefits associated with the project as they are realized. In short, it
is this Joint Venture structure that makes the implementation of NIPSCO's
2018 IRP possible.

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as described by Witness McCuen. 7 Q41. What are the non-tax ownership attributes of the Rosewater Project 8 retained by NIPSCO? 9 A41. The Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO customers: 10 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the power from the project or project or project developer.	1	Q40.	Is ther	e an estimate of the value from monetizing the PTCs?
to NIPSCO is estimated to reduce the rate base amount for the Rosewalt Project by approximately from from from to a range of from second to a range of from second to a range of from second to a range of from from from from from from from f	2	A40.	Yes. D	Depending on the final terms of the LLC Agreement, by structuring
Project by approximately % from \$ to a range of \$ as described by Witness McCuen. What are the non-tax ownership attributes of the Rosewater Project retained by NIPSCO? He Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO customers: NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. Phase the project of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	3		the trai	nsaction through the Joint Venture the costs of the Rosewater Project
as described by Witness McCuen. 7 Q41. What are the non-tax ownership attributes of the Rosewater Project 8 retained by NIPSCO? 9 A41. The Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO customers: 10 customers: 11 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	4		to NIP	SCO is estimated to reduce the rate base amount for the Rosewater
7 Q41. What are the non-tax ownership attributes of the Rosewater Project retained by NIPSCO? 9 A41. The Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO customers: 11 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	5		Project	by approximately % from \$ to a range of \$
8 retained by NIPSCO? 9 A41. The Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO to customers: 11 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	6			as described by Witness McCuen.
9 A41. The Joint Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO 10 customers: 11 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allo 12 it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project 14 lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed 15 PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the project at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	7	Q41.	What	are the non-tax ownership attributes of the Rosewater Project
customers: (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	8		retaine	ed by NIPSCO?
11 (1) NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow it to operate the project efficiently. 13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	9	A41.	The Joi	nt Venture provides at least the following five benefits to NIPSCO's
it to operate the project efficiently. (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	10		custom	ners:
13 (2) The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project 14 lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed 15 PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the project at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	11		(1)	NIPSCO will have full control of the wind project, which will allow
lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of to PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	12			it to operate the project efficiently.
PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	13		(2)	The levelized cost of the power from the project over the project's
PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member	14			lifetime will be less than if NIPSCO built the project or just signed a
	15			PPA with a project developer. This is due to the monetization of the
17 the joint venture, it will have no interest in operating the facility.	16			PTCs at their maximum value. Despite the TEP being a member of
	17			the joint venture, it will have no interest in operating the facility.

1		(3)	NIPSCO's power portfolio will be more diversified because it will
2			eventually include an owned, renewable asset. The two other
3			requests for issuance of CPCNs NIPSCO is filing along with this
4			case relate to PPAs for wind projects that NIPSCO will not own.
5		(4)	NIPSCO will not have to bear the counterparty risk that exists in a
6			traditional PPA.
7		(5)	NIPSCO will have the option to repower the project at the end of its
8			life or to retire it, whichever provides its customers the best value.
9	Q42.	Why	is it in the public interest to relieve NIPSCO from or otherwise find
10		that	NIPSCO has satisfied the obligations to receipt of a CPCN
11		estab	lished under Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-5(e)?
12	A42.	There	e are certain competitive procurement requirements set forth in Ind.
13		Code	§ 8-1-8.5-5(e). Since the Rosewater Project arose out of the All-Source
14		RFP,	NIPSCO seeks to be relieved of or otherwise found to have complied
15		with	those requirements. On the unique circumstances of this case,
16		addit	ional competitive procurement requirements would not only be

unnecessary but they would also jeopardize the implementation of the

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2018 IRP.

1	Q43.	Why is it in the public interest that NIPSCO be permitted to include its
2		investment in the Joint Venture in NIPSCO's rate base for ratemaking
3		purposes?
4	A43.	Witness Camp describes this aspect of the ARP in greater detail; however,
5		without the ability to earn a return on its investment in the Joint Venture,
6		there would be no incentive for NIPSCO to pursue the Joint Venture. As I
7		understand it, traditional ratemaking would permit us to include in rate
8		base the value of NIPSCO's utility plant. NIPSCO must create the Joint
9		Venture structure to capture the value of the tax benefits from the
10		Rosewater Project for the benefit of NIPSCO's customers. If traditional
11		ratemaking would deny NIPSCO the ability to earn a return on the
12		investment that is needed to capture the value of those benefits, then
13		NIPSCO cannot make that investment. Approving this aspect of
14		NIPSCO's ARP is in the public interest because it enhances the value of
15		NIPSCO's services for its customers and allows NIPSCO to implement the
16		2018 IRP.

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1	Q44.	Why is the aspect of the ARP related to the recovery of costs paid			
2		pursuant to power purchase agreements in the public interest?			
3	A44.	This is addressed by Witness Camp.			
4	Q45.	Why is it necessary to relieve NIPSCO and the Commission from the			
5		technical requirements set forth in Ind. Code §§ 8-1-2-79 and 80?			
6	A45.	This relates to financing authority. As Witness Camp is describing, the			
7		request for financing is purely conditional – NIPSCO is not issuing new			
8		debt. NIPSCO is not selling any securities. The provisions that NIPSCO			
9		seeks to be relieved of are provisions that are related to the issuance of			
10		securities. These requirements are simply unnecessary in this context.			
11	Q46.	In summary, why should the Commission approve the Joint Venture and			
12		the proposed ARP you have described in order to implement the			
13		Rosewater Project?			
14	A46.	Returning to the statute quoted earlier, Ind. Code §8-1-2.5-6(a)(1)			
15		authorizes the adoption of alternative regulatory practices, procedures and			
16		mechanisms if they are in the public interest (after considering the factors			
17		set forth in Ind. Code §8-1-2.5-5) and if they will enhance or maintain the			
18		value of NIPSCO's retail energy services or property. The Joint Venture			

and each of the elements of NIPSCO's proposed ARP are in the public interest for the reasons described herein. By implementing the Rosewater Project through the Joint Venture structure, NIPSCO is reducing the overall cost of the Rosewater Project to NIPSCO and to NIPSCO's customers. This enhances the value of NIPSCO's retail energy services and property. Two of the factors in Ind. Code §8-1-2.5-5 are especially

applicable here, because approval of the Joint Venture and the proposed

ARP will be beneficial to NIPSCO, NIPSCO's customers, and the State of

Indiana. Further, by reducing overall cost, approval of the ARP promotes

energy utility efficiency.

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11 Q47. Finally, you mentioned Commission jurisdiction over Joint Venture.

What is being requested in this regard?

13 A47. Because the Joint Venture will not be the title owner of the Rosewater
14 Project, Joint Venture will not own electric generation facilities that
15 provide electricity that NIPSCO will use to serve the public. Instead,
16 NIPSCO will purchase 100% of the electrical energy output of the
17 Rosewater Project at market based rates from Rosewater ProjectCo under
18 the BTA PPA. As such, Joint Venture is not a "public utility." Joint

Venture will own Rosewater ProjectCo, which will own facilities that only provide service to NIPSCO on a wholesale basis. To the extent the Commission disagrees and determines that Joint Venture is a "public utility," Joint Venture elects to become subject to Ind. Code § 8-1-2.5-5. The unique circumstances of this arrangement, the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction of NIPSCO, and the regulation by FERC render the exercise of jurisdiction by this Commission over Joint Venture as a public utility unnecessary or wasteful. Further, declining to exercise jurisdiction will be beneficial to Joint Venture, NIPSCO, NIPSCO's customers and the State of Indiana. Declining to exercise jurisdiction will also promote energy utility efficiency. In addition, the exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction over Joint Venture as a public utility will inhibit the implementation of NIPSCO's generation transition plan as set forth in its 2018 IRP. Accordingly, the Commission should proceed to issue an order declining to exercise its jurisdiction over Joint Venture as a public utility. Finally, NIPSCO requests that the Commission confirm that once Rosewater ProjectCo becomes an affiliated interest of NIPSCO, it will maintain the declination of jurisdiction, assuming such is granted, in the proceeding initiated by Rosewater ProjectCo seeking a declination of Commission

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1 jurisdiction.

CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY (CPCN)

2	Q48.	You mentioned that you would discuss the request for a CPCN. What
3		relief is being sought?
4	A48.	NIPSCO seeks a CPCN pursuant to Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-2 to purchase and
5		acquire the Rosewater Project through the Joint Venture. I have already
6		described the costs of the Rosewater Project. I have also described in detail
7		why the acquisition of the Rosewater Project through the Joint Venture is
8		in the public interest. For the same reasons, the public convenience and
9		necessity require this acquisition. The proposed ARP addresses
10		competitive procurement.
11	Q49.	Is the purchase and acquisition of the Rosewater Project through the
12		Joint Venture structure that you have described consistent with
13		NIPSCO's 2018 IRP?
14	A49.	Yes. As explained by Witness Augustine, the Rosewater Project is
15		consistent with the 2018 IRP.

- 1 Q50. Are you familiar with the Commission's 2018 Report on the Statewide
- 2 Analysis of Future Resource Requirements for Electricity?
- 3 A50. Yes. That report was issued by the Commission in the Fall of 2018. The
- 4 purchase and acquisition of the Rosewater Project through the Joint
- 5 Venture is also consistent with that analysis.

RECOVERY OF COSTS

- 6 Q51. If all of the BTA's conditions precedent are met, how will the costs of
- 7 the BTA PPA be recovered?
- 8 A51. NIPSCO is proposing to timely recover the costs in accordance with Ind.
- 9 Code §§ 8-1-8.5-6 and 8-1-8.8-11, through a rate adjustment mechanism
- approved pursuant to Ind. Code § 8-1-2-42(a) on the basis of energy
- 11 concurrent with its FAC filings. Furthermore, NIPSCO is seeking approval
- of power purchases pursuant to the BTA PPA as reasonable throughout
- the entire term of the agreement and therefore confirmation that the costs
- thereof are recoverable through the FAC filing without regard to the Ind.
- 15 Code § 8-1-42(d) tests or any other FAC benchmark. This is described in
- 16 greater detail by Witness Camp.

1	Q52.	If all of the BTA's conditions	precedent not are met	, how will the costs

2	of the	Back-Stop	PPA	be recovered	ed?
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3 A52. If the Back-Stop PPA is necessary, NIPSCO is proposing to recover the 4 costs through a rate adjustment mechanism approved pursuant to Ind. 5 Code § 8-1-2-42(a) on the basis of energy concurrent with its FAC filings. 6 Furthermore, NIPSCO is seeking approval of power purchases pursuant 7 to the Back-Stop PPA as reasonable throughout the entire term of the 8 agreement and therefore confirmation that the costs thereof are 9 recoverable through the FAC filing without regard to the Ind. Code § 8-1-10 42(d) tests or any other FAC benchmark. This is also described by Witness 11 Camp.

Q53. How are any environmental attributes or RECs reflected?

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Attribute" is intended to capture any changes to governmental rules, regulations or law, or changes to registration systems put in place over the term of the BTA PPA and Back-Stop PPA. I refer to the Environmental Attributes acquired as RECs, which are tradable credits corresponding to each megawatt-hour of electricity generated by a renewable-fueled or

environmentally friendly source. NIPSCO anticipates the RECs it receives will be tracked through the Midwest Renewable Energy Tracking System ("M-RETS"). M-RETS is a database that tracks relevant information about renewable energy produced and delivered in the Upper Midwest, including the MISO footprint, to verify for subscribers in states with mandatory or voluntary renewable portfolio standards or for utility and other participants the RECs made available to them through REC purchases and sales. M-RETS will track the ownership of RECs and generation attributes that result from the generation of renewable electricity.

INTRODUCTION OF OTHER WITNESSES

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- 11 Q54. Please introduce the other witnesses and the subject matter of their testimony.
- A54. Patrick N. Augustine, Principal in CRA's Energy Practice, discusses the preferred portfolio from NIPSCO's 2018 IRP and how the assumptions associated with the new wind resource options modeled in the 2018 IRP compare with the cost of NIPSCO's investment in the Joint Venture).

 Robert Lee, Vice President of CRA, explains the analysis NIPSCO used to

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Joint Petitioners' Confidential Exhibit No. 1 Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC RoseWater Wind Generation LLC Page 45

1 evaluate its various options for wind energy and why NIPSCO's 2 investment in the Joint Venture is an economic choice for helping meet 3 NIPSCO's retail electric load. Michael D. McCuen, Director of Income 4 Taxes for NiSource Corporate Services Company ("NCSC"), describes the 5 joint venture structure and how it provides value to NIPSCO's customers. 6 Angela Camp, NIPSCO's Controller supports other aspects of NIPSCO's 7 alternative regulatory plan and NIPSCO's proposed accounting and 8 ratemaking and accounting treatment for (1) its investment under the joint 9 venture, and (2) costs associated with the wind PPA.

- 10 Q55. Does this conclude your prefiled direct testimony?
- 11 A55. Yes.

VERIFICATION

I, Andrew S. Campbell, Director of Regulatory Support & Planning for Northern Indiana Public Service Company LLC, affirm under penalties of perjury that the foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Andrew S. Campbell

Date: Febuary 1, 2019

Attachment 1-A [Verified Joint Petition – Not duplicated herein]







